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The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial 
Distortion of the Legislative-Executive Balance of 
Power 
[C]ongress has a wonderful power that only judges and lawyers 
know about. Congress has a power to keep silent. . . . Of course, 
when [C]ongress keeps silent, it takes an expert to know what it 
means. But the judges are experts. They say that [C]ongress by 
keeping silent sometimes means that it is keeping silent and 
sometimes means that it is speaking.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In simplistic constitutional terms, Congress makes law that the 
President enforces. More specifically, Congress makes law by 
enacting statutes through a series of specific requirements outlined in 
Article I, Section 7, and, unless acting under his own constitutionally 
assigned power, the President is bound by that law. To the formalist, 
who believes in strict adherence to the constitutionally prescribed 
boundaries between law enactment and law enforcement, that is the 
end of the story.2 The Supreme Court recognized the importance of 
formal requirements and their impact on the separation of powers 
when it struck down the legislative veto because it failed to follow 
 
 1. Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of 
Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 522 (1982) (quoting Thomas 
Reed Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931, 932 (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. 1938)). 
 2. See, e.g., John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: 
A Venture into “Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 746 (1984) (“Congress can 
create law only by enacting a statute, and statutes may be enacted only if the specific 
constitutional prerequisites contained in article I, section 7 of the U.S. Constitution have been 
met. . . . [U]nder our constitutional structure of government, Congress ‘cannot legislate 
effectively by not legislating at all.’” (citations omitted) (quoting F. REED DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975))); Daniel L. Rotenberg, 
Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375, 376 (1992) (“[F]ailure 
to follow the [constitutionally prescribed] method results in no law.”). As Professor Eskridge 
explains, formalism prefers “bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable 
limits on public actors.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and 
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998).  
BAKER.PP3 2/13/2009 6:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2009 
226 
the constitutional rules.3 On the other hand, to the functionalist, 
who values greater flexibility, there is more to the story.4 And, in 
fact, other Supreme Court decisions indicate that on occasion 
Congress effectively asserts its own authority, or constrains the 
authority of the President, not by formal enactment of law, but by 
doing nothing at all.5 
As the epigraph above adroitly observes, the judiciary alone 
decides whether Congress has spoken through silence. Courts wield 
significant power in determining whether the President has acted 
appropriately in the face of congressional inaction, and they should 
tread lightly as their judgments trace the boundaries between 
legislative and executive power. Where Congress has failed to act or 
purposely chosen not to act, a gap in authority or power remains, 
which the President often feels compelled to fill.6 Executive action in 
such situations would appear to fall within the second category 
described by Justice Jackson in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer concurrence: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if 
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In 
this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than 
on abstract theories of law.7  
 Where congressional intention is difficult to discern, as in the 
case of inaction, this “zone of twilight” provides judges with crucial 
 
 3. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). The Chadha opinion is 
commonly cited as an example of formalist reasoning. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real 
Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2000).  
 4. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 21. Eskridge explains that functionalists prefer 
“standards . . . that seek to provide public actors with greater flexibility.” Id. Indeed, according 
to Professor Eskridge, functionalism “might be understood as emphasizing pragmatic values,” 
id. at 22, and “functionalist reasoning promises adaptability and evolution,” id. at 21.  
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (treating President 
Taft’s withdrawal of public lands in contravention of congressional legislation as impliedly 
authorized by a long history of congressional acquiescence to such actions). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). 
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wiggle room to navigate their way to an outcome that maintains 
proper balance between the powers of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches. 
However, when judges find implied meaning in congressional 
inaction this wiggle room disappears, creating an analytical paradox 
in that an adaptable, functionalistic approach to what constitutes 
congressional will leads to a clearer, more determinate conclusion on 
the validity of the executive action.8 Depending on the result of such 
judicial determination, the executive action either falls into Jackson’s 
first category, where executive “authority is at its maximum” because 
“the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
of Congress”;9 or the third category, where executive authority “is at 
its lowest ebb” because “the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”10 The validity of 
executive actions thus depends to a large degree on whether courts 
hear the implied will of Congress in silence. Given the tremendous 
authority of the judiciary to shape the separation of powers in our 
constitutional system, it is essential that the judicial branch play a 
measured role as referee and avoid the pitfalls of giving too much 
voice to congressional silence. This is especially true at the present 
time, when the apparent expansion of presidential power in the 
interest of economic stability and national security, as well as 
through claims of executive privilege, has prompted heated 
constitutional debate over the proper roles of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of government.11  
 
 8. This analytical paradox also works in the other direction: judges who choose not to 
recognize an implied congressional will, without formal action, employ a bright-line approach 
that leads to the murky “zone of twilight” analysis where flexibility governs. Perhaps the 
paradox is an inherent aspect of judicial reasoning in this area. As Professor Eskridge observes, 
this dichotomous interplay between formalism and functionalism “is apparent even in the 
rhetorical discourse about the relationship of the three, or more, branches of the national 
government. ‘Separation of powers’ connotes relatively formalist inquiries of rules, deductions, 
and sharp lines. ‘Checks and balances,’ on the other hand, connotes relatively functionalist 
inquiries of standards, inductions, and flexible interactions.” Eskridge, supra note 2, at 22.  
 9. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
 10. Id. at 637. 
 11. Most recently, critics of the Bush administration’s decision to provide loan funds to 
the ailing auto industry questioned the constitutional validity of such action in the face of 
congressional inaction. Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich opined: 
Call me old-fashioned, but I believe in democracy. And under our Constitution, 
Congress is in charge of appropriating taxpayer money. If Congress explicitly 
decides not to appropriate it for a certain purpose, where does the White House get 
the right to do so anyway? By pulling the money out of another bag?  
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The Supreme Court has demonstrated how this power to 
interpret congressional inaction works in practice. For example, in 
cases such as United States v. Midwest Oil Co.12 and Dames & Moore 
v. Regan,13 the Supreme Court validated the executive action and 
relaxed the constraints on executive authority in relation to Congress 
based on an implied congressional acquiescence to the action at 
issue. In others, such as Youngstown, the Supreme Court rejected 
executive action in the face of congressional silence to constrain a 
President seen as trespassing in legislative territory. By giving 
judicially sanctioned meaning to congressional inaction in these 
cases, the Supreme Court has both loosened and tightened 
constraints on presidential power, but not always with proper 
concern for the overall balance that should be maintained. While 
Midwest Oil represented a sensible and sensitive application of the 
congressional acquiescence doctrine, Dames & Moore improperly 
extended presidential power by applying the doctrine too loosely, 
and the Youngstown Court disturbed the balance between the 
branches of government through giving meaning to one form of 
congressional silence while ignoring others. 
In the latter two cases, Dames & Moore and Youngstown, the 
Court misinterpreted congressional inaction and thus failed to 
appreciate the broader “practical consequences of [these] decisions 
about governmental structure.”14 These misinterpretations effectively 
removed the executive actions at issue in these cases from a “zone of 
twilight” analysis that offers more flexibility and helps limit the 
impact on the balance of power between branches. Perhaps in cases 
where congressional inaction renders congressional intent unclear at 
best, Jackson’s “zone of twilight” would be most appropriate. But 
those courts discerning an implied will from congressional inaction 
should look to Midwest Oil as an example of a measured, sensitive 
approach to congressional acquiescence, while avoiding Dames & 
 
That other bag, by the way—called the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP for 
short—was enacted to rescue Wall Street, not the automobile industry.  
Posting of Robert Reich to Robert Reich’s Blog, http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2008/12/ 
big-three-and-tarp-what-happened-to.html (Dec. 17, 2008, 11:51 EST). 
 12. 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
 13. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 14. E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507 (1989) (discussing separation of powers jurisprudence within 
the context of the Court’s failure to provide a cohesive separation of powers doctrine, but not 
specifically referencing these two cases). 
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Moore as an overextension of the doctrine and Youngstown as an 
inconsistent interpretation of congressional inaction. 
This Comment will analyze past forays into this area by the 
Supreme Court—represented by Midwest Oil, Dames & Moore, and 
Youngstown—and their effects on presidential power. Part II clarifies 
the debate surrounding the meaning of congressional silence and 
offers a broader framework to reconcile formalistic and 
functionalistic concerns. Part III then discusses the doctrine of 
congressional acquiescence, first announced and properly applied in 
Midwest Oil, but later inappropriately expanded in Dames & Moore. 
Part IV briefly examines analytical weaknesses in the Court’s 
treatment of congressional silence in Youngstown, arguing that more 
specific action by Congress is necessary to maintain the proper 
balance between the roles of Congress and the President. Generally, 
the more congressional silence speaks on issues of such importance, 
the less likely governmental power will be balanced and exercised 
appropriately. 
II. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE 
Not everybody agrees that congressional silence has any 
meaning, especially in separation of powers cases. To the formalist, 
the proposition is absurd: “If Congress is the source of authority or 
the source of the denial of authority of, for example, certain action 
by the President, then it seems beyond doubt that congressional 
silence does not suffice to provide or deny authority for action.”15 
Laurence Tribe describes more generally “a longstanding resistance, 
as a matter of law, to the idea that legislative inaction or silence, 
filtered through a judicial stethoscope, can be made to sound out 
changes in the law’s lyrics—altering the prevailing patterns of rights, 
powers, or privileges that collectively constitute the message of our 
laws.”16 Moreover, past Supreme Court justices have condemned 
reliance on congressional silence as, in Justice Harlan’s words, “a 
poor beacon to follow.”17 For Justice Rutledge, “[t]here [were] vast 
differences between legislating by doing nothing and legislating by 
 
 15. Rotenberg, supra note 2, at 376; see also Grabow, supra note 2, at 741 (“[D]espite 
any intuitive appeal reliance on congressional silence may possess, there exists no legal or 
functional justification for the imputation of any meaning to the necessarily frequent and 
prolonged silences of Congress.”). 
 16. Tribe, supra note 1, at 516. 
 17. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969). 
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positive enactment.”18 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter warned that “we 
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of . . . 
legislation a controlling legal principle.”19 
On the other hand, there are obvious practical advantages that 
encourage judges to employ functionalistic reasoning. The public 
actors whose behavior the courts must analyze are themselves 
moving targets, and the constitutional system of government the 
courts must uphold often lends itself to fluid interactions among 
those actors. Justice Jackson recognized the value in adaptable, 
flexible analytical approaches in his second Youngstown category; 
there are, he suggested, moments when a weakness or tendency in 
one branch of government—such as “congressional inertia”—blurs 
the line of authority between branches such that judges must rely on 
less formal considerations, including “the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables.”20 Functionalists are basically 
pragmatists, a characterization which allows them to adjust their 
analysis to the needs of any given set of facts to promote “pragmatic 
values like adaptability, efficacy, and justice in law.”21 
But who is right—the formalist or the functionalist? As Donald 
Elliot argues, the question itself may be wrong.22 Instead of 
subjecting the issue of congressional silence in separation of powers 
cases to the formalist-functionalist dichotomy, courts should look 
more broadly “to develop a sophisticated theory of the underlying 
philosophy of our structure of government.”23 That endeavor 
requires answering a more appropriate question: “whether a new 
measure or device is consistent with the Framers’ vision of 
 
 18. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 19. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). 
 20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).  
 21. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 22. 
 22. Elliot, supra note 14, at 508–09. 
 23. Id. at 509. By contrast, Professor Michael Glennon believes that “separation of 
powers is not a distinct analytical doctrine,” and thus does not require the use of any newly 
fashioned analytical tools. Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (1984). In Professor Glennon’s view, the 
satisfactory resolution of separation of powers cases requires a “comprehensive analytical 
framework” whereby the customary analytical tools—e.g., “the constitutional text, the intent 
of the Framers, or custom and practice”—can be used more effectively to “discover which of 
these sources will be determinative” in any given case. Id. at 111. Courts should look first to 
the text; but if the issue cannot be resolved textually, Professor Glennon proposes an analytical 
framework that dictates how custom and practice can be consistently applied to reach a 
conclusion. Id. at 111–12. 
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government as reflected and made manifest to us by the 
constitutional structure that they created, and elaborated by our 
subsequent history and traditions.”24 In other words, courts should 
decide more generally whether an action fits the contours of our 
accepted governmental structure and the respective roles of each 
branch. When viewed through this wider lens, the following seminal 
separation of powers cases involving the relationship between 
congressional silence and presidential power come into clearer focus.  
III. THE GOOD, BAD, AND UGLY OF CONGRESSIONAL 
ACQUIESCENCE 
Well, it is earth with me; silence resumes her reign: 
I will be patient and proud, and soberly acquiesce.25 
Broadly speaking, the judicial doctrine of congressional 
acquiescence states that Congress can impliedly authorize 
presidential actions or judicial interpretations by failing over time to 
signal disagreement or opposition.26 In many ways, congressional 
acquiescence simply reflects a practical and political reality. While not 
explicitly based in the Constitution, it takes on the weight of a 
“quasi-constitutional custom.”27 Harold Koh suggests several factors 
that shape this reality, including “legislative myopia, inadequate 
drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional absence of 
political will.”28  
The mere fact that congressional acquiescence occurs in practice, 
however, does not automatically sanction its application by judges to 
the resolution of difficult separation of powers cases.29 Many legal 
scholars argue that reliance on congressional acquiescence as a source 
 
 24. Elliot, supra note 14, at 513. 
 25. Robert Browning, Abt Vogler, reprinted in THE COMPLETE POETIC AND DRAMATIC 
WORKS OF ROBERT BROWNING 382, 383 (Cambridge ed., Cambridge Univ. 1895), available 
at http://books.google.com/books?id=8KEVAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+ 
complete+dramatic+and+poetic+works+of+robert+browning#PPA383,M1. 
 26. See Grabow, supra note 2, at 745–47. 
 27. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1282 (1988) (quoting Harold Hongju 
Koh, Introduction: Foreign Affairs Under the United States Constitution, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
3 & n.7 (1988)). 
 28. Id. at 1297. 
 29. Indeed, these are often the cases where, as Justice Jackson observed, “what is at 
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952). 
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of law is misguided and misplaced.30 Others contend that, when 
applied correctly, it “preserves valuable flexibility in the operation of 
our constitutional scheme.”31 While the doctrine of congressional 
acquiescence has its formal and functional drawbacks, courts should 
apply it sensitively, as in Midwest Oil, to strike the appropriate 
balance of power between Congress and the President. But courts 
should refrain from invoking the doctrine in cases such as Dames & 
Moore, where reliance on congressional acquiescence skews, rather 
than preserves, this balance by validating executive action that 
encroaches in the legislative domain.  
A. Origins: United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 
At first glance, Midwest Oil represents a revolution in separation 
of powers disputes. As Henry Monaghan notes, the case “is 
occasionally cited as a decision—the only decision, I should add—in 
which the Supreme Court upheld presidential law-making contrary 
to the terms of an Act of Congress.”32 While Professor Monaghan 
rejects this reading as “untenable,”33 its appeal is understandable 
based on the facts of the case. In 1897, Congress passed a statute 
opening up public lands to be explored and purchased by citizens for 
discovery and removal of oil deposits.34 But in 1909, the “oil was so 
rapidly extracted” that President Taft ordered a temporary 
withdrawal of the ability to explore and purchase lands due to the 
“immediate necessity for assuring the conservation of a proper supply 
of petroleum for the Government’s own use.”35 Given the explicit 
conflict between the congressional enactment and Taft’s executive 
 
 30. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 67, 90–108 (1988) (citing as reasons for concern the formal nature of statutory 
enactments, the “indeterminacy of collective intent” and “systemic problems” in the legislative 
process).  
 31. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (1982). Professor Bruff warns that the value in flexibility must be balanced by “the 
value of identifying relatively clear spheres of responsibility for the branches.” Id. He also 
observes that “the doctrine demands sensitive application, lest it become an excuse for 
upholding any presidential action not explicitly forbidden by statute.” Id. 
 32. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
44 (1993).  
 33. Id. 
 34. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 466 (1915). 
 35. Id. at 466–67. 
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order, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of determining what, 
if any, authority justified the President’s action.  
1. The Court’s enunciation of the congressional acquiescence doctrine 
Rather than repudiate the President’s action or justify it under 
Article II, the Court relied on “an implied grant of power”—in other 
words, congressional acquiescence—to approve the withdrawal.36 
Between 1850 and 1910, the Court cited 252 executive orders 
where, to at least some extent, the President had withdrawn public 
lands in spite of congressional provisions leaving them open “to 
acquisition by citizens.”37 These “orders were known to Congress, as 
principal, and in not a single instance was the act of the agent 
disapproved.”38 The Court reasoned that: 
[G]overnment is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both 
officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any 
long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the 
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed 
to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That 
presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and 
quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the 
existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even 
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.39  
 Forestalling the possibility that the President could “by his 
course of action[,] create a power,” the Court allowed only that he 
could properly act when a “long-continued practice, known to and 
acquiesced in by Congress . . . raise[s] a presumption that the 
withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent.”40 The 
President’s response to the situation was “natural” because “[he] was 
in a position to know when the public interest required particular 
portions of the people’s lands to be withdrawn from entry or 
location.”41 
 
 36. Id. at 474–75. 
 37. Id. at 469–71. 
 38. Id. at 475. 
 39. Id. at 472–73. 
 40. Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 471. 
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2. An appropriate application of the doctrine 
In formalistic terms, Midwest Oil seemed to herald the expansion 
of presidential power by judicial interpretation of congressional 
silence. But several factors from the case temper this view, leading 
instead to the conclusion that the Court properly applied 
congressional acquiescence as a means to reconcile the respective 
roles of Congress and the President.  
First, Midwest Oil involved authority assigned to Congress not 
under Article I of the Constitution, but under Article IV. As the 
Court observed, 
[T]he land laws are not of a legislative character in the highest 
sense of the term . . . ‘but savor somewhat of mere rules prescribed 
by an owner of property for its disposal.’  
. . . .  
For it must be borne in mind that Congress not only has a 
legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the 
powers of the proprietor therein.42  
 Congress was acting as proprietor and the President as its agent. 
The Court’s application of congressional acquiescence merely 
“recognized [the] administrative power of the Executive in the 
management of the public lands.”43  
Second, because Midwest Oil focused on the discrete category of 
land law, some scholars would limit the precedential value of 
Midwest Oil to that context.44 Professor Monaghan disagrees by 
pointing to the Court’s citation of “numerous decisions in a wide 
variety of contexts in support of its reasoning” as evidence that “the 
Court’s analysis of presidential power was not confined to the limited 
issue of presidential withdrawal of public lands.”45 Although the 
citation of those “numerous decisions” may indicate that the Court 
did not intend to confine its analysis to the narrow issue of land law, 
the Court’s reference to those cases does not extend as far as 
 
 42. Id. at 474 (quoting Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905)). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President’s Foreign Economic Powers After 
Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 68, 86 (1982) 
(“The legislative acquiescence in Midwest Oil therefore validated an exercise of presidential 
power unique to land laws . . . .”). 
 45. Monaghan, supra note 32, at 45. 
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Professor Monaghan would suggest. Those decisions, by the Court’s 
own account, dealt almost exclusively with administrative powers: 
Stuart v. Laird46 involved “[granting] circuit powers to judges of the 
Supreme Court”;47 McPherson v. Blacker48 discussed “the validity of a 
state law providing for the appointment of Presidential electors”;49 
and Grisar v. McDowell50 cited “the practice of the Executive 
Department . . . as evidence of the validity of these orders making 
reservations of public land.”51 Professor Monaghan neglects to 
specify that the “wide variety of contexts” cited by the Court does 
not include any cases involving presidential powers beyond mere 
administrative acts, such as the executive land management at issue 
in the case. Accordingly, application of Midwest Oil’s congressional 
acquiescence principles should be limited in the presidential context 
to administrative acts. To move beyond that implied boundary, 
especially to acts that regulate or injure private interests or individual 
rights, would endanger the balance of power established in the 
Constitution by removing a critical check on presidential power. 
Finally, as suggested above, the Midwest Oil Court correctly 
applied congressional acquiescence because the President’s 
withdrawal violated no inherently private rights. As the Court 
observed: 
But when it appeared that the public interest would be served by 
withdrawing or reserving parts of the public domain, nothing was 
more natural than to retain what the government already owned. 
And in making such orders, which were thus useful to the public, 
no private interest was injured. For prior to the initiation of some 
right given by law the citizen had no enforceable interest in the 
 
 46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 47. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 473. 
 48. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 49. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 473. 
 50. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867). 
 51. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 473. The Court also cites Fairbank v. United States, 181 
U.S. 283 (1901) and Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851), which was overruled on 
other grounds by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Id. The former 
involved congressional power to tax inheritances. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 307. The latter 
discussed the validity of state-imposed pilotage fees. See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 312. Neither 
examined presidential actions in light of congressional acquiescence. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. 
283; Cooley, 52 U.S. 299. It is not surprising, then, that both were merely cited without 
treatment in Midwest Oil. 
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public statute and no private right in land which was the property 
of the people.52  
 Indeed, President Taft sincerely believed that the public interest 
demanded such action.53 Far from the invasion of private rights, Taft 
may have exercised instead what Professor Monaghan calls “the 
protective power” of the presidency.54 Under this conception, “[t]he 
Executive is authorized to exert the power of the United States when 
he finds this necessary for the protection of the agencies, the 
instrumentalities, or the property of the Government.”55 Professor 
Monaghan actually borrows this description from the Solicitor 
General’s brief defending President Taft’s actions in Midwest Oil.56  
The Supreme Court’s application of congressional acquiescence 
in Midwest Oil strikes the proper balance between the powers of 
Congress and the President by recognizing the proprietor-agent 
relationship of the two branches in administrative areas. The Article 
IV power at issue has not traditionally been exercised by Congress 
through specific legislation authorizing presidential administration, 
but through a well-established proprietor-agent relationship. In 
practical terms, it made no sense to alter this situation. The scope of 
the decision was further limited by the administrative nature of 
public land withdrawal, as well as the lack of any precedent for 
congressional acquiescence in the case of injury to private rights. 
Such limitation prevents “the potential for ‘bootstrapping’ of 
presidential power, whereby presidents can, over time, accrue power 
that they should not have simply because they have exercised it 
enough times.”57 It also mitigates Dean Koh’s “one-way ‘ratchet 
effect,’” whereby a broader doctrine of congressional acquiescence, 
 
 52. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 471. 
 53. See id. at 466–67 (indicating the governmental reports of public necessity that 
President Taft relied upon in making his proclamation for the withdrawal).  
 54. See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 61–74. Professor Monaghan’s conception of 
“protective power” fits well within the framework of a broader analysis of the balance of 
powers between branches and their proper roles: “The protective power is . . . no talisman. Its 
limits are, in the end, practical ones, limits that, as the Court said in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, are grounded in our ‘common understanding’ of what conduct is appropriately 
‘executive’ in our scheme of separation of powers.” Id. at 73 (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 69 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691 
(1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 58 (2001). 
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when taken together with the Court’s rejection of the legislative 
veto, “effectively redraws the categories described in Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.”58 Although President Taft’s 
executive order contravened explicit congressional legislation, no 
substantive alteration to the balance of power between Congress and 
the President resulted from congressional acquiescence to his action.  
B. Expansion: Dames & Moore v. Regan  
In subsequent cases, most notably Dames & Moore,59 the 
Supreme Court failed to keep the Midwest Oil holding within proper 
bounds. In that case, the Court relied on the doctrine of 
congressional acquiescence from Midwest Oil to uphold presidential 
authority to suspend the private claims of Dames & Moore against 
the Iranian government as part of the resolution to the hostage crisis. 
Justice Rehnquist’s unanimous majority opinion speaks “of the 
necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable 
of deciding the case.”60 Although it is admittedly difficult to criticize 
the outcome given the delicate state of the nation during that time, 
the Court failed to achieve this stated purpose.61 The Court’s overly 
functionalistic approach to congressional acquiescence violates the 
spirit and purpose of Midwest Oil by extending the application of the 
doctrine beyond administrative acts to the realm of private rights in 
the absence of any clearly implied authorization from Congress. 
 
 58. Id. (quoting HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 142 (1990)). 
 59. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 60. Id. at 660. 
 61. Even the staunchest critics of the Court’s decision stop short of calling for a 
different outcome: 
To criticize the Court’s conclusions is not to suggest that it should have held 
otherwise. Given the unique context of the case, it is difficult to fault the Court for 
upholding the President’s authority to enter into agreements with Iran. The 
agreements resolved a prolonged and debilitating foreign affairs trauma. Once the 
hostages had been released, it was impossible to restore the status quo ante. The 
international consequences of dishonoring the President’s undertaking were 
unpredictable. Limited to its unique facts, the Court’s decision was tolerable as well 
as predictable. Unfortunately, the Court’s analysis cannot be limited to the facts of 
Dames & Moore. Despite its professed caution, to uphold the President’s actions the 
Court was forced to rely on an unprecedented reading of the President’s statutory 
and constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs. The case establishes a precedent 
that may cause serious mischief in the future and, therefore, cannot easily be 
dismissed. 
Marks & Grabow, supra note 44, at 69–70. 
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What’s more, the Court could have avoided this problem by 
ignoring altogether the question of whether Congress had spoken or 
been silent, focusing instead on a “zone of twilight” analysis that 
would, in Justice Jackson’s words, “depend on the imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.”62 As such, the case would have been treated as a 
pragmatic aberration, rather than an extension of a well-established 
legal doctrine.  
1. Procedural history and brief background facts  
Dames & Moore involved executive orders and regulations 
implemented as part of the hostage release agreement with Iran. The 
petitioner-company, Dames & Moore, had obtained judgment and 
attachment of assets against Iranian banks in a breach of contract 
case.63 However, the executive orders signed by the President 
effectively nullified the attachment and threatened to suspend the 
company’s claims from U.S. courts altogether, setting up an 
alternative Claims Tribunal to adjudicate.64 Dames & Moore 
challenged the validity of the executive agreements, and the case 
came before the Supreme Court for “expeditious treatment of the 
issues involved.”65 
2. The “general tenor” of congressional legislation 
After concluding “that the IEEPA [International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act] constitute[d] specific congressional 
authorization to the President to nullify the attachments and order 
the transfer of Iranian assets,” the Court turned to “the question of 
the President’s authority to suspend claims pending in American 
courts.”66 Recognizing that no congressional legislation explicitly 
delegated authority to the President to suspend the private claims of 
Dames & Moore, the Court ventured into the murky abyss of 
implied authorization.67  
 
 62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 63. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664. 
 64. Id. at 663–66. 
 65. Id. at 660. 
 66. Id. at 675. 
 67. See id. at 675–88. 
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To begin, the Court loosened the statutory bearings before 
engaging in congressional acquiescence analysis. Although the 
IEEPA and the Hostage Act fell short of authorizing the President’s 
action, the Court found “both statutes highly relevant in the looser 
sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for 
executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this 
case.”68 While “the IEEPA delegates broad authority to the President 
to act in times of national emergency with respect to property of a 
foreign country,” the Hostage Act “similarly indicates congressional 
willingness that the President have broad discretion when responding 
to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns.”69 There is nothing concrete 
about the Court’s statutory analysis here because no language in the 
IEEPA or the Hostage Act actually sustained the interpretation given 
by the Court. Nevertheless, the Court apparently “[could not] 
ignore the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area,”70 
which, it claims, was “best demonstrated by . . . the International 
Claims Settlement Act of 1949.”71 As scholars have pointed out, 
however, the ICSA “[gave] no such discretion or authority to the 
President,”72 and the Court correctly declined to rest its holding on 
such tenuous underpinnings. But by seizing on broader, unspoken 
outlines, the Court prepared the way for its assertion of implied 
authority through congressional acquiescence.  
3. The shaky past of congressional acquiescence 
Looking to the past, the Court found “a history of congressional 
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.”73 
As the Court recognized, establishing such implicit approval by 
 
 68. Id. at 677 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 678. 
 71. Id. at 680. 
 72. Marks & Grabow, supra note 44, at 90. Professors Marks and Grabow argue that 
the scope of ICSA, which “provide[s] for the adjudication of claims arising primarily out of the 
nationalization of American property,” renders it inapplicable to the context of Dames & 
Moore. Id. In fact, “Congress created the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission” to handle 
claims involving “the rights of American claimants,” but the Commission does not act in the 
absence of congressional legislation “specifically authoriz[ing] each new program.” Id. at 90–
91. Finally, “[t]he Court’s reliance on the ICSA is also misplaced because the Algerian 
Declarations contravene one of the primary goals of the ICSA: providing equal treatment to all 
United States claimants.” Id. at 91. By contrast, the Algerian Declarations called “for disparate 
treatment of various categories of claimants.” Id.  
 73. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981). 
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Congress in the President’s actions was “[c]rucial to [its] decision.”74 
By way of proof, however, the Court ignored the “substantial 
controversy” surrounding “the general practice of using executive 
agreements,” and instead relied on “self-selected precedents” 
focusing on the “[particular] . . . practice [of] executive claims 
settlement agreements.”75 Yet even within this narrower field of 
executive action, the Court overstated its case by failing to recognize 
critical distinctions between past executive claims settlements and the 
one at issue in the case.76 Professors Marks and Grabow point out 
that, prior to 1952, “the United States adhered to the doctrine of 
absolute sovereign immunity, which denied state and federal courts 
jurisdiction over suits against foreign governments.”77 Because the 
issue presented in Dames & Moore “was whether the President could 
force a plaintiff with a cognizable claim pending against a sovereign 
government to accept an alternative forum,” the history of executive 
claims settlement prior to 1952 “offered no support whatsoever to 
the exercise of presidential power in Dames & Moore.”78 Moreover, 
post-1952 claims settlement history similarly failed to provide “a 
single instance in which the President has, as in Dames & Moore, 
settled the commercial claims of American citizens enforceable in 
United States courts.”79 
4. An unwarranted expansion of the Midwest Oil doctrine 
Although pragmatic, the Court’s analysis of congressional 
acquiescence in Dames & Moore inappropriately and unnecessarily 
expanded the proper scope established by Midwest Oil. As described 
above, the latter case involved exercise of the President’s 
administrative powers under Article IV, which rendered analytical 
flexibility less problematic, while the former dealt with foreign policy 
powers that affected private rights and thus required express 
authority from Congress. In Midwest Oil, the Court relied on 
unquestioned custom as suitable justification where the President 
and Congress had a long-established proprietor-agent relationship in 
 
 74. Id. at 680. 
 75. Glennon, supra note 23, at 129–30. 
 76. See Marks & Grabow, supra note 44, at 87–90. 
 77. Id. at 87–88.  
 78. Id. at 88.  
 79. Id. 89–90. 
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the administration of land laws. However, in such a critical, dynamic 
context like foreign policy, as in Dames & Moore, the Court should 
have been more cautious in validating extensions of the President’s 
scope of authority, especially where the historical pedigree was 
disputed. 
In addition, the Dames & Moore Court validated an executive 
action that effectively denied the private right of the company to 
have its claims settled in U.S. courts. There is particular need for 
judicial restraint—as well as congressional and presidential restraint, 
for that matter—in areas that affect the rights of private citizens. The 
Midwest Oil Court recognized this consideration and ascribed 
appropriate weight to it in its analysis of the case. That no private 
rights were endangered by President Taft’s withdrawal weighed 
heavily in favor of congressional acquiescence. By contrast, the 
Dames & Moore decision mentioned the effect of the executive 
orders on the rights of the company only after concluding the bulk 
of its analysis: “Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the 
means chosen by the President to settle the claims of American 
nationals provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, which 
is capable of providing meaningful relief.”80 While the Court 
recognized that the Claims Tribunal might treat claimants such as 
Dames & Moore less favorably than a U.S. court,81 it failed to 
address the fact that the claimant did not choose the forum change 
and might face “disparate treatment” under the Algerian 
Declarations, depending on its category.82 
Finally, while the Midwest Oil Court described a sustained, 
visible, and consistent congressional acquiescence in presidential 
administration and withdrawal of public lands, the Dames & Moore 
Court overreached in finding “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned.”83 As discussed above, historical analysis of 
 
 80. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981). 
 81. See id. at 687 (“[B]eing overly sanguine about the chances of United States 
claimants before the Claims Tribunal would require a degree of naiveté which should not be 
demanded even of judges . . . .”). 
 82. See Marks & Grabow, supra note 44, at 91. 
 83. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). As Professors Marks and 
Grabow assert, “the quoted passage [from Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence] is dictum,” “no 
other member of the Court joined his opinion,” and Justice Frankfurter reasoned that such 
long-standing practices “may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President 
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executive claims settlement in Dames & Moore was at best 
inconclusive, and at worst vastly insufficient to establish 
congressional acquiescence to the President’s resolution of private 
claims—as a means to an end of the hostage crisis—through 
executive agreement. Although the Court recognized “that executive 
action in any particular instance falls . . . at some point along a 
spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to 
explicit congressional prohibition,” the Court misplaced the actions 
at issue in the case closer to the former point of explicit 
congressional authorization than could be reasonably justified.84  
  As a result of its decision, the Dames & Moore Court 
improperly altered the balance of power between the President and 
Congress in favor of the former and thus judicially engineered an 
enhanced version of the Midwest Oil doctrine. In the name of 
pragmatic politics, it lowered the threshold required to assert 
authority under the doctrine and applied the doctrine in a wider 
range of circumstances than should have been allowed. To one 
commentator, the decision echoes a paraphrased version of Justice 
Jackson’s ominous warning in Korematsu v. United States:  
A [political] order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last 
longer than the [political] emergency. . . . [Once] a judicial 
opinion[, however,] rationalizes such an order to show that it 
conforms to the Constitution . . . the Court for all time has 
validated the principle . . . . The principle then lies about like a 
loaded weapon [. . . ].85 
 Of course, the Court could have followed Justice Jackson’s 
advice and refused to hear the case, rather than “approve [the 
President’s action] under law and thus clothe the decision in 
constitutionality.”86 By not simply “recogniz[ing] that President 
Carter’s decision . . . was a ‘political’ decision based on exigency. . . . 
[and] was necessary to free the hostages,”87 without passing 
judgment on the matter, the Court took Midwest Oil far beyond the 
 
by § 1 of Art. II,” whereas the Dames & Moore Court based its decision on implied 
congressional authority. Marks & Grabow, supra note 44, at 85. 
 84. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. 
 85. Rotenberg, supra note 2, at 381 (alteration in original) (quoting Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
 86. Id. at 380. 
 87. Id. 
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boundaries set forth in that case and, thus, corrupted the doctrine of 
congressional acquiescence.88  
Alternatively, the Court could have ignored congressional 
acquiescence entirely and analyzed the case under Justice Jackson’s 
second category of executive action described in Youngstown. That 
way, the Court’s analysis would have explicitly announced its 
pragmatic angle, effectively limiting any precedential impact the case 
might have had on the doctrine of congressional acquiescence and 
the balance of power in our constitutional system. Unfortunately, 
however, in spite of its own disclaimers as to how broadly its decision 
should be interpreted, the Court’s treatment of congressional 
inaction as implied consent cloaked its analysis of the President’s 
actions in misleading and unwarranted certainty.  
IV. PASSING THE BUCK: SILENCE AS A SHIELD IN YOUNGSTOWN 
It is not only what we do, but also what we do not do, for which 
we are accountable.89 
Until now, this Comment has largely focused on congressional 
silence or, more specifically, acquiescence applied in favor of broader 
presidential license to act—to the potential or actual detriment of 
Congress. Midwest Oil presented a sensitive and appropriate 
interpretation of congressional silence, where the Court took a 
broad, careful view of the balance of power between Congress and 
the President while, at the same time, being mindful of how its 
 
 88. It is not difficult to imagine the possibility that congressional acquiescence might be 
put to ill-advised use down the road in the global War on Terror or some other sticky domestic 
or international conflict. In fact, as Dean Koh recognizes, congressional silence and 
acquiescence over the years has greatly contributed to the shift in foreign affairs power from 
Congress to the President:  
[W]hat very naturally has happened is simply that power textually assigned to and at 
any time resumable by the body structurally unsuited to its exercise [Congress], has 
flowed, through the inactions, acqui[e]scences, and delegations of that body, 
toward an office ideally structured for the exercise of initiative and for vigor in 
administration [the President]. . . . The result has been a flow of power from 
Congress to the presidency. 
Koh, supra note 27, at 1292 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Charles Black, The 
Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 17, 20 
(1980)). 
 89. Jean Baptiste Moliere, in TRYON EDWARDS, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS: BEING 
A CYCLOPEDIA OF LACONIC QUOTATIONS FROM THE BEST AUTHORS OF THE WORLD, BOTH 
ANCIENT AND MODERN 528 (F.B. Dickerson Co. 1908), available at http://books. 
google.com/books?id=zlMxAAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage#PPA528,M1. 
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decision would affect that relationship. In Dames & Moore, however, 
the Court engaged in a functionalistic, unwarranted expansion of 
congressional acquiescence as outlined in Midwest Oil, which both 
shifted the balance and failed to recognize, or effectively limit, the 
effects of that shift.  
By contrast, the Youngstown Court dealt more generally with 
congressional inaction in several different forms. Most famous for 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, with its tripartite test described 
above in Part I, Youngstown involved a constitutional challenge to an 
executive order by President Truman “directing the Secretary of 
Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s 
steel mills.”90 The order followed a series of failed administrative 
attempts to resolve disputes between labor and management in the 
steel industry.91 With the country engaged in the Korean War, and 
given “the indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all 
weapons and other war materials,” President Truman attempted to 
seize the mills in order to avert a strike and the resulting decline in 
wartime production.92 The morning after issuing his order, President 
Truman reported his actions to Congress, but received no 
response.93 Twelve days later, he again alerted Congress to the 
situation and reiterated his position that Congress could accept or 
reject his actions.94 But again, Congress said and did nothing.95 
Not long after, the steel companies filed suit in federal court to 
enjoin the President’s actions.96 Eventually the case made its way to 
the Supreme Court, which was “asked to decide whether the 
President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued 
[the] order.”97 The government conceded that the President lacked 
congressional authorization for the seizure,98 arguing instead that 
“presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his 
powers under the Constitution.”99 In his majority opinion, Justice 
 
 90. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
 91. Id. at 582–83. 
 92. Id. at 583. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 677 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 583 (majority opinion). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 582. 
 98. Id. at 585–86. 
 99. Id. at 587. 
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Black invalidated the seizure order as an unconstitutional exercise of 
presidential power.100 But the case is most famous for Justice 
Jackson’s concurring opinion, in which he describes the three 
distinct analytical categories in which to place any questionable 
executive action.101  
Simply put, Justice Black’s opinion rested primarily on an 
elementary conception of the separation of powers: the President 
cannot exercise lawmaking powers because “[t]he Founders of this 
Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in 
both good and bad times.”102 But this overly formalistic reasoning 
fails to take a broader view of the relationships and practical realities 
involved. For Professor Elliot, this “explanation simply will not do” 
because throughout the nation’s history, “the executive branch has 
issued over ten thousand executive orders, many of which plainly 
‘make laws’ in every sense at least as much as did the [Youngstown] 
order.”103  
More significantly, Justice Black’s opinion presents a problem of 
greater concern than a simplistic view of government structure. 
Along with a few of his concurring colleagues, he adopted an 
interpretation of congressional silence as a limit on the President’s 
authority to act, relying on the fact that “[w]hen the Taft-Hartley 
Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an 
amendment which would have authorized such governmental 
seizures in cases of emergency.”104 In Professor Tribe’s words, “a 
decisive majority of five Justices treated Congress’ silence as speech—
its nonenactment of authorizing legislation [here, the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, or Taft-Hartley Act] as a legally 
binding expression of intent to forbid the seizure at issue.”105 Justice 
Frankfurter agreed with Justice Black’s analysis, concluding that 
“Congress could not more clearly and emphatically have withheld 
authority than it did [by rejecting the amendment] in 1947.”106 
Finally, Justice Burton joined the chorus with his belief that “the 
 
 100. Id. at 588–89. 
 101. Id. at 635–39 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 589 (majority opinion). 
 103. Elliot, supra note 14, at 525. 
 104. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. 
 105. Tribe, supra note 1, at 520. 
 106. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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most significant feature of that Act [LMRA or Taft-Hartley] is its 
omission of authority to seize an affected industry.”107 
But the problems go deeper. In fact, the majority and concurring 
opinions are even more remarkable for the way they give meaning to 
one form of congressional silence, the “omission of authority”108 for 
the seizure in the LMRA, but ignore other forms without comment, 
including congressional silence in response to repeated efforts by 
President Truman to involve the Legislative Branch in the process.109 
Only the dissenting Chief Justice Vinson found compelling 
significance in Truman’s message to Congress the day after the 
seizure and letter to the President of the Senate twelve days later.110 
Both missives described the nature of his actions and gave Congress 
the opportunity to determine what should be done going forward.111 
While he believed that the urgency of the moment required seizure 
of the steel mills, Truman recognized that ultimately the power 
rested with Congress to ratify or reject his action.112 The failure of a 
majority of the Court to address this secondary congressional silence 
results in an inconsistent approach and lack of accountability that 
does injustice to all three branches of government. In fact, the 
Court, in one fell swoop—or, more accurately, a plurality and several 
concurrences—simultaneously shifts responsibility for the result, 
allows Congress to do the same, and punishes the President, left 
alone among the parties to shoulder the weight of the outcome. 
A. The Supreme Court Passing the Buck to . . . 
Professor Tribe suggests that the Youngstown majority gives 
“legal effect to Congress’ silence . . . [in part because] the public 
 
 107. Id. at 657 (Burton, J., concurring). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. at 675–77 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. 
 112. In his first letter to Congress, President Truman provided a list of possible responses 
and concluded, “I do not believe the Congress will favor any of these courses of action, but 
that is a matter for the Congress to determine.” Id. at 677. In his second letter, Truman 
openly acknowledged that “[t]he Congress can, if it wishes, reject the course of action I have 
followed in this matter.” Id. But it appears that Truman himself did not think that 
congressional action was required to sustain his efforts in the short term, as he suggested in the 
first letter: “On the basis of the facts that are known to me at this time, I do not believe that 
immediate congressional action is essential; but I would, of course, be glad to cooperate in 
developing any legislative proposals which the Congress may wish to consider.” Id.  
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acceptability of their intended holding is bolstered by the illusion 
that the power they wield traces to Congress’ will rather than to their 
own.”113 In other words, given the politically sensitive nature of the 
case, the Court thought it best to divert attention away from itself by 
basing its holding on an unspoken but implied congressional intent. 
In Tribe’s view, congressional silence provides a useful judicial tool 
whereby judges can “disclaim responsibility for altering the legal 
landscape by passing the buck to Congress”114 and “make it appear 
that the power exercised by the Supreme Court proceeds from 
Congress.”115 Although this view reflects a deep cynicism about 
judicial interpretation, reliance by a majority of the Youngstown 
Court on implied congressional will fairly raises the question. 
As with Dames & Moore, the Court may have been better off not 
hearing Youngstown in the first place. Given the urgency of the 
situation, the Court thought it best “that the issues raised be 
promptly decided by this Court” and granted certiorari just days 
after the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed an 
injunction against the government’s seizure issued by the District 
Court.116 But even if we accept the necessity of the Supreme Court’s 
role in resolving this dispute, the Court’s analysis did unnecessary 
damage to the balance of power between the President and Congress 
and allowed the latter to escape all responsibility for its inaction 
during this urgent moment. In addition to ignoring the lack of 
congressional response to Truman’s letters, the Court encouraged 
future congressional inaction in moments of crisis by discerning an 
implied rejection of Truman’s actions by Congress in its earlier 
rejection of an amendment to the LMRA that would have allowed 
for seizures like the one at issue, while ignoring the lack of 
congressional response to Truman’s letters. Finally, the Court 
ironically deferred to “congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence,” which, Justice Jackson admitted, “may sometimes, at 
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility.”117 By so doing, it lost an 
opportunity to temper these inherent weaknesses in the Legislative 
 
 113. Tribe, supra note 1, at 521. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (quoting Clarence Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, 
in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 842 (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. 1938)). 
 116. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584 (majority opinion). 
 117. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Branch, and left the Executive Branch wondering what, if anything, 
it can do in such moments. Thus, the Court should have instead 
analyzed Truman’s power to order the seizure under Justice 
Jackson’s second category, or “zone of twilight,”118 in which the 
conclusion would be based “on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables,”119 rather than on the supposedly 
determinate implied meaning of congressional inaction.  
B. Congress Passing the Buck to . . . 
But, as the above discussion suggests, shifting responsibility and 
avoiding accountability are not limited to the Court. In fact, Tribe 
asserts that “Congress itself may well conspire in this buck-passing—
for, having said nothing, its members are free in turn to point right 
back to the courts when called upon to defend what courts claim 
Congress has, by its silence, brought to pass.”120 While there is no 
shame in rejecting the authorization of the seizure power in the 
LMRA, congressional silence in response to Truman’s overtures fails 
to satisfy the demands of the separation of powers principles on 
which our government is based. After Truman acted beyond his 
presidential authority, Congress should have provided what Madison 
might call the “counteract[ing] ambition.”121 Because “[t]he interest 
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place,”122 Congress had an affirmative duty to make clear its intent, 
regardless of political pressure, rather than allow the decision to be 
made by the unelected Supreme Court. As John Hart Ely has said, 
[T]he common case of nonaccountability involves not a situation 
where the legislature has drawn a distinction whose range of [goals] 
won’t be readily apparent, but rather a situation where the 
legislature (in large measure precisely in order to escape 
accountability) has refused to draw the legally operative 
distinctions, leaving that chore to others who are not politically 
accountable.123 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Tribe, supra note 1, at 521. 
 121. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 122. Id.  
 123. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 130–31 (1980). 
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Congress, one of the three constituent branches of government, 
should not use silence as a shield from accountability on matters of 
such importance to the balance of power. 
This does not mean that congressional silence should not exist at 
all—that is, that Congress must always act with clear intentions so 
that courts have an easier time determining congressional will. 
Practical realities inherent in the institution, such as “congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence,”124 or even lack of political will in 
a body filled with actors representing conflicting priorities, 
necessarily lead to moments of uncertainty as to congressional intent. 
Courts, in no position to alter this reality, must tolerate it. But 
courts should never act in a manner that encourages these 
tendencies, especially on issues that directly affect the balance of 
power in our constitutional system. 
C. President Truman’s Desk: “The Buck Stops Here” 
As for Truman, the Court’s treatment of congressional silence 
clearly weakened him in Youngstown. The decision itself was 
probably correct, but the Court’s interpretation of congressional 
silence had unintended negative consequences for the Presidency. 
Some critics, including Professor Monaghan, deny the existence of 
an “emergency” in Youngstown.125 But the fact remains that, while 
“[a]mple time existed for congressional action, both before and after 
the seizure,”126 Congress never did anything to contribute to a 
solution.127 As he wrote in his first letter to Congress, Truman acted 
as he thought appropriate given his sense of the situation.128 In some 
ways, congressional refusal to act even after Truman’s letters 
demonstrated not overreaching by the President, but dereliction of 
duty by Congress. As Professor Monaghan observes, “[i]f we assume 
that the President can act in an emergency, our constitutional theory 
would suggest that subsequent congressional approval is necessary, 
because that requirement . . . would seem to induce caution in the 
 
 124. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 125. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 32, at 37–38 (“[D]espite the government’s 
argument and President Truman’s statement, no emergency existed.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 38. 
 128. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 677 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 
3962–63 (1952)). 
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executive, while not being so onerous as to deter the President from 
acting when necessity warrants.”129  
Of all the actors in this drama, Truman appears to be the only 
one to understand this principle. He took action, in his words, “with 
the utmost reluctance” in what he felt to be an emergency.130 But 
immediately thereafter he appealed to Congress, recognizing that 
“[i]t may be that the Congress will deem some other course to be 
wiser.”131 In spite of the government’s claims in the course of 
litigation that the President had inherent authority for his actions, 
Truman’s conduct reflected an ideal course for a President who 
“find[s] himself confronted with a situation of such complexity and 
ambiguity as to leave him without guidelines for constitutional 
action.”132 He understood that “it would be far better for him to 
take the action he saw fit without attempting to justify it in advance 
and leave it to Congress or the courts to evaluate his action in 
retrospect.”133 Constitutional balance between the branches is best 
preserved through this kind of purposeful action. President Truman 
acted with such purpose, but the Congress failed to respond in kind, 
and the Supreme Court, in its selective interpretation of 
congressional inaction, failed to recognize that this difference 
matters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Maintaining the proper balance of power between Congress and 
the President is a delicate and difficult business—made even more so 
by the reality of congressional silence on matters that could shift the 
balance. The Supreme Court, charged as expert at interpreting 
meaning, has met with mixed results. While Midwest Oil’s doctrine 
of congressional acquiescence strikes a sensitive balance, the Court 
later expanded the doctrine beyond proper boundaries in Dames & 
Moore. In Youngstown, the Court gave selective meaning to 
congressional silence and, by so doing, shifted blame from itself to 
Congress, which allowed Congress, in turn, to acquiesce in the buck-
 
 129. Monaghan, supra note 32, at 38. 
 130. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 675 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 
3962–63 (1952)). 
 131. Id. at 676. 
 132. S. REP. NO. 91-129, at 32 (1969). Many would argue that Truman faced no such 
situation except in his own mind. This paper reserves judgment on this point. 
 133. Id. 
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passing and shift blame to the President. Only Truman lived up to 
his constitutional obligation to take purposeful action; yet he alone 
was held accountable. Constitutional balance requires that Congress 
accept accountability, and that the Supreme Court listen more 
closely, and more wisely, when Congress fails to speak. 
Due to the delicate nature of judicial responsibility in this area, 
courts should refrain whenever possible from giving positive meaning 
to congressional inaction. Midwest Oil represents a sensible exception 
to this rule. But in Dames & Moore and Youngstown, the Supreme 
Court did unnecessary harm to the balance of power between 
branches. Rather than interpret the congressional silence and channel 
cases into Justice Jackson’s more determinate and clear cut first and 
third categories, which gives these decisions more weight, the Court 
should take the lighter, more flexible approach offered by his second 
category and its “zone of twilight” analysis. This would preserve the 
invitation for the President to act in moments of congressional 
paralysis, without encouraging continued behavior of this sort in 
Congress. Best of all, because the “zone of twilight” analysis 
depends so heavily on case-by-case determinations, the danger of its 
flexible nature will be mitigated in ways that judicial interpretations 
of congressional silence, with their cloak of certainty, are not.  
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